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Abstract
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Whereas conventional wisdom argues that markets shut 
down during crises, with sellers struggling to find buyers, 
we find that markets continue to operate during financial 
turmoil, even in narrow and volatile emerging economies. 
Simple event studies indicate that both trading volume 
and trading costs increase in crisis times. Prices change 
more with each dollar transacted (pushing the Amihud 
illiquidity measure up) and bid-ask spreads widen. More 
generally, econometric estimates show that large price 
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the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at sschmukler@worldbank.org. 
downturns, typical of crises, are associated with higher 
trading activity and increased trading costs, with trading 
activity declining only later as crises progress. Thus, 
while trading activity tends to be negatively related to 
trading costs during tranquil times (and across securities), 
this relation appears to break down during crises. These 
results are consistent with the analytical literature on 
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1.Introduction 
As conventional wisdom has it, markets shut down during financial crises, as 
sellers struggle to find their buyers.
1 However, an empirical assessment of what really 
goes on with secondary market liquidity in periods of financial distress is far from trivial, 
as a quick survey of the related literature illustrates. Whereas the relation between 
liquidity and market returns in the United States has been studied extensively in both 
directions, the results differ according to the measures of liquidity in use (which include 
indicators of trading activity and trading costs). Moreover, much less is known about the 
behavior of secondary-market liquidity (in its different dimensions) in periods of 
financial turmoil, a critical test to evaluate both the functioning of financial markets and 
the mechanics of financial crises. This paper contributes to fill in this gap, conducting the 
first systematic empirical study of secondary-market liquidity under stress across 
emerging market crises.  
A generally accepted theoretical argument relating liquidity and market returns is 
the collateral-based view: Pronounced falls in asset prices reduce the value of financial 
intermediaries’ capital and increase their margin calls, forcing them to liquidate their 
positions, thereby inducing wider bid-ask spreads and increasing the price response to 
trading.
2 Since net withdrawals are a function of the intermediaries’ performance, when 
the value of assets drop, the short-term inflow of funds decreases or even reverses, 
forcing financial intermediaries to sell, adding to the price downturn, and generating a 
                                                 
1 “…[M]arkets in stuff that is normally traded all the time … have shut down because there are no buyers,” 
notes Paul Krugman in the New York Times of Aug. 11, 2007, describing the most recent liquidity crisis in 
the developed world. Many other similar quotes can be found in major newspapers describing, for example, 
the LTCM, Russian, and Mexican crises, in the context of both developed and emerging markets. 
2 In addition to margin calls due to trade losses, margins are often raised during market illiquidity periods 
because margin-setting financiers cannot determine whether price changes are due to transient liquidity 
shocks or to more permanent fundamental news.  3  
spiraling fall in some liquidity measures.
3 Therefore, market liquidity is closely related to 
intermediaries’ funding needs, and this mutually reinforcing relation can generate sudden 
spikes in illiquidity indicators. While collateral-based theories assume that outside capital 
does not enter the market during downturns, fire-sale theories highlight precisely the role 
of outside capital: Lower asset prices reward liquid outside buyers who profit from 
illiquid asset holders.
4 Fire sales (namely, forced widespread selling from distressed 
funds when investors redeem their capital en masse) put downward pressure on prices, as 
outside buyers demand additional compensation for providing needed liquidity.  
Another strand of the literature has elaborated other models with heterogeneous 
investors (due, for example, to asymmetric information, heterogeneous investment 
opportunities, and/or government interference) that provide a possible explanation for the 
positive relation between trading volume and absolute changes in asset prices. If trading 
volume reflects disagreement between traders upon receiving new information, the 
greater the degree of disagreement, the higher the level of the trading volume, which 
could explain why volume is found to be positively correlated with market volatility and 
with sharp price fluctuations in particular.
5 Broner et al. (2006 and 2007) explore the role 
of secondary markets in helping solve problems of enforcement and repayment by 
redistributing assets to favored investors. They predict that turnover increases in periods 
of financial turbulence, when enforcement problems and default probabilities increase.  
                                                 
3 See Vayanos (2004) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007). 
4 See Acharya and Schaefer (2005) for several explanations. In one such model, Coval and Stafford (2006) 
argue that mutual funds that experience capital outflows are forced to execute their positions, generating a 
significant price pressure on commonly-held assets, with price falling far from fundamental value and 
turning attractive for outside liquidity providers. As a result, their model offers no unambiguous prediction 
regarding the level of liquidity after a significant fall in asset prices. 
5 See Karpoff (1986), Gallant et al. (1992), Campbell et al. (1993), Hiemstra and Jones (1994), Wang 
(1994), and He and Wang (1995).  4  
Empirically, the literature has used two types of measures as proxies of 
secondary-market liquidity: (i) measures related to trading activity (such as volume and 
turnover) and (ii) measures related to trading costs (such as the price reaction to trading 
and bid-ask spreads).
6 These two types of indicators jointly characterize what is typically 
called a liquid market: “a market where participants can rapidly execute large-volume 
transactions with a small impact on prices,” that is, at a low cost (BIS 1999).  
Although they are often assumed (and shown) to be related, trading activity and 
trading cost capture different aspects of secondary markets and do not need to behave 
similarly. In tranquil times and across securities, higher volume is associated with lower 
transaction costs. In other words, all liquidity proxies move in the same direction.
7 But 
the behavior changes in periods of financial turbulence, when shocks are of different 
nature. For example, a sudden increase in trading activity as investors rush to the exit 
might signal an increased trading demand for a given market depth, congesting the 
market and raising transaction costs. In fact, Chordia et al. (2001) show that bid-ask 
spreads and trading-activity variables respond differently during up and down markets. 
While trading-activity variables increase both in rising and falling markets, bid-ask 
spreads respond asymmetrically by increasing significantly in down markets and 
decreasing only marginally in up markets.
8  
In emerging markets, where crises abound, liquidity has not received much 
attention. One exception is Lesmond (2005), who looks at bid-ask spreads as well as 
                                                 
6 The price reaction to trading is captured by the Amihud ratio (Amihud, 2002). In addition, several other 
measures have been proposed, such as the Roll measure (Roll, 1984), the LOT measure (Lesmond et al. 
1999), and the Amivest measure (Cooper et al., 1985; Khan and Baker, 1993). 
7 See, for example, Stoll (1978) and Chordia et al. (2000). 
8 An up (down) market is defined as a positive (negative) CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) 
daily index return. Chordia et al. (2005) also find that crises and returns raise trading costs, while Hameed 
et al. (2006) report that bid-ask spreads fall after significant negative market returns when controlling for 
demand effects (order imbalances), supporting the collateral-based view.  5  
several alternative measures of liquidity (turnover, and the already-mentioned Amihud, 
Amivest, LOT, and Roll measures) for 31 emerging markets over 1987–2000. While he 
does not perform any econometric test, he shows a significant within-country correlation 
between all liquidity proxies (with the exception of turnover) and a sharp increase during 
the crisis period 1997:Q3 to 1998:Q3 (again, with the exception of turnover, which 
appears unaffected). This type of casual evidence provides the most natural motivation 
for a deeper econometric study of the kind presented here.
9  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 
3 presents the methodology and findings. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We focus on a variety of emerging markets and crisis episodes over the period 
April 1994-June 2004. We use stock data rather than bond data, which is usually harder 
to collect and, when available, covers shorter time spans. The data come from Bloomberg 
and the Emerging Market Database (EMDB). 
High-frequency (daily) financial data for emerging economies is often plagued by 
missing or, worse, misreported data and their accuracy cannot be taken for granted. We 
spent considerable time in the selection process to include only the most liquid stocks for 
each country, in order to minimize the effect of mismeasurement on our results. Indeed, 
                                                 
9 In a recent paper, Chen and Poon (2007) find that return volatility Granger-causes a widening of the 
Amihud ratio, and argue that it is not illiquidity that leads to sharp price declines, but vice versa. For more 
analysis on emerging market liquidity, see for example Levine and Schmukler (2006).  6  
what is particularly interesting about the behavior documented in this paper is that there 
are significant effects on trading costs even for the most liquid stocks.
10  
In selecting stocks, we require a number of strict qualifying conditions: (i) a stock 
has to account for at least 1% of the total value traded in the country (measured by the 
average value traded in the six months prior to the beginning of the crisis); (ii) the stock 
has to be traded at least 2 years prior and after the crisis (except in Mexico and Russia 
where no information was available for any stock more than 1 year prior to the start of 
their respective crises). We include for each stock the series from the first moment the 
stock is traded until June 2004 (or earlier if the stock stopped trading prior to June 2004). 
Note that some stocks have shorter bid-ask spread series (or none at all) but are still 
included in the portfolio.
11 
We use three alternative liquidity measures to capture the two aspects implicit in 
the standard definition of market liquidity, computed as averages of qualifying daily data 
at weekly and monthly frequencies. These are: (i) trading volume (to reflect trading 
activity), ln(1/T Σ
T
t=1 Volt); (ii) the Amihud ratio (which measures trading costs through 
the price impact of trades): 1/T Σ
T
t=1|Rt|/Valuet;
12 and (iii) bid-ask spreads (as a second 
measure of trading costs): 1/T Σ
T
t=1 (Askt – Bidt)/Bidt. Volt (Valuet) is the number of 
                                                 
10 Less liquid stocks present patterns that are comparable to those of liquid stocks in terms of the evolution 
of trading activity and trading costs over time, albeit of different magnitude. In addition, there might be a 
flight to quality to the most liquid stocks at times of crises, which could also affect their relative behavior. 
See Levy Yeyati et al. (2006) for a discussion of these issues. 
11 Additionally, special care was placed in correcting the remaining inconsistencies found in the raw data, 
which are seldom cleaned by the data sources. Among other things, we excluded ostensible outliers and 
corrected for unexplained regime shifts in trading volume during non-crisis periods (in which case the 
series was used only until or after the break, depending on whether the shift took place after or before the 
crisis period). 
12 The Amihud ratio is interpreted in the literature as a measure of the reaction of prices to changes in value 
traded. Given that prices and quantities lie on some supply and demand schedules and the relation between 
them is not necessarily unidirectional, the ratio may capture both a shift in the supply curve (more people 
selling), or in the demand curve (less people buying).  7  
shares (U.S. dollar value) traded in the day, and Rt in the Amihud ratio is the daily 
(percentage) price change during the day.
13 To construct these measures we use a total of 
21,900 weekly observations based on 105,000 original daily observations, covering seven 
emerging markets: Argentina (7 stocks), Brazil (8), Indonesia (7), South Korea (5), 
Mexico (12), Russia (5), and Thailand (8).
14 
As crisis dating is to some extent arbitrary, we employ two different criteria to 
define crisis periods in order to verify the robustness of our findings. We define SM 
crises based on the local stock market index: SM crises begin when the stock market 
index starts a decline of at least five consecutive weeks that reach a cumulative drop in 
excess of 25%, and end on the first date after which the index grows for at least four 
consecutive weeks. Alternatively, we use an exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index 
of daily changes in interest rates and exchange rates (referred to as EMP crises). EMP 
crises begin when the volatility of EMP (its 15-day rolling standard deviation) exceeds a 
threshold level (set equal to the mean EMP volatility plus one standard deviation), and 
ends on the first date after which the EMP volatility stays below the threshold level for at 
                                                 
13 Volume is made missing (not zero) on days when the stock market is closed. If the stock is not traded on 
a certain day, the price is also made missing (to avoid carrying over the price of the previous day and 
miscomputing returns) as is the Amihud ratio; volume is zero on those days. Since we work only with 
liquid stocks, non-trading days are infrequent. 
14 The stocks used for each country are the following. Argentina: Banco Frances del Rio de la Plata, Grupo 
Financiero Galicia S.A., Irsa-Inversiones y Representaciones S.A., Petrobras Energia Participaciones, 
Siderar S.A., Telecom Argentina, and Transportadora de Gas Sur S.A. Brazil: Aracruz Celulosa S.A., 
Banco Bradesco S.A., Companhia Brasileira de Distribuicao Grupo Pao de Acucar, Companhia Siderurgica 
Nacional, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, Electrobras (Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.), and Unibanco 
(Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros S.A.). Indonesia: Astra International, Gudang Garam, Hanjaya Mandala 
Sampoerna, Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Corp, Indofood Sukses Makmur, Indosat TBK, and Telekomunikasi 
Indonesia. Mexico: Alfa S.A., Cemex S.A., Empresas ICA Sociedad Controladora S.A., Fomento 
Economico Mexicano, Grupo Industrial Maseca, Grupo Televisa S.A., Holcim Apasco S.A., Kimberly 
Clark de Mexico S.A., Savia S.A., Telefonos de Mexico, Vitro S.A., and Wal-Mart de Mexico S.A. South 
Korea: Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company, Korea Electric Power Corporation, Pohang Iron & 
Steel Company, Samsung Electronics Company, and SK Telecom. Russia: Mosenergo, Oil Company 
LUKOIL, Rostelecom, Tatneft, and Unified Energy System. Thailand: Bangkok Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, 
Kasikornbank, Krung Thai Bank Public Company, Thai Military Bank Public Company, Thanachart 
Capital Public Company, True Corp, and Siam Commercial Bank.    8  
least three consecutive months.
15 We also capture crises and price downturns with other 
variables.  
3. Methodology and Findings 
We approach the data from two angles, using event studies and more standard 
econometric techniques. First, we conduct event studies to examine in a more 
straightforward way whether our liquidity variables display a different behavior during 
crises. In particular, we define the event (time zero) as the beginning of a crisis, and look 
at the average deviations of liquidity variables during the crisis period relative to the pre-
crisis mean over an equal length period. For each liquidity variable Xt, we compute the 
estimated post-crisis (
*) deviations from the pre-crisis mean                     . We then test 
the hypothesis                                , where N is the number of post-crisis trading days, 
with                               .
16 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the results. The 3-panel chart illustrates the 
behavior of the typical stocks, showing the average across the stocks included in our 
sample, around the corresponding crisis events, for an arbitrary 110-day window.
17 The 
table at the bottom reports the results of the event study tests, where events are defined as 
sharp stock market downturns (SM crises) and typically include more than one event per 
country. Both charts and table suggest a common preliminary pattern: all three measures 
appear to increase during crises. In particular, as in the existing literature, the Amihud 
                                                 
15 EMP is computed as the weighted average of the daily changes in the interest rate and the log difference 
of the exchange rate, with weights equal to the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the respective 
variables. See Levy Yeyati et al. (2006) for a list of EMP crises and a detailed account of their 
determination. The SM crisis dates are available upon request.  
16 See Campbell et al. (1997).  
17 The window corresponds to the shortest crisis event (55 days) and was chosen for the sake of presenting 
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ratio and bid-ask spreads widen despite the increase in trade volume, which in this case 
reaches 26%. 
After a first glance at the data applying these simple tests, we resort to more 
standard econometric techniques to have a closer look: we regress each liquidity measure 
on a number of controls, using dynamic panel models with fixed effects. In addition, to 
check for potential bias associated with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in 
the panel regressions, we run stock-by-stock AR(1) regressions to compare the results 
(we report the mean group estimators for these tests).
18 
The baseline specification, which we report in Table 1, is based on weekly data. It 
includes as controls the average price change during the current week, splitting positive 
and negative changes to measure stock market downturns directly (rather than through 
the SM crisis dummy) and to study the asymmetric behavior documented in previous 
work. In addition, a separate crisis dummy (based on EMP crises) is included, which we 
split into an early and late crisis dummy to account for the fact that financial distress is 
often accompanied by intense but short-lived portfolio reallocations and fire sales.
19 
Furthermore, we include month dummies (to control for seasonality), the log change in 
the local currency-dollar nominal exchange rate (to control for the fact that most of these 
crises are associated with sharp exchange rate realignments), the lagged dependent 
                                                 
18 Nickell (1981) shows that in the AR(1) case the bias in estimating a dynamic fixed effects model 
becomes less important as T grows, and estimates this bias to be of O(1/T), a finding confirmed by Hahn 
and Kuersteiner (2002) and Alvarez and Arellano (2003) for panels with large N and large T. In addition, 
Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias introduced by including a lagged dependent variable is larger 
for the parameter estimate of the AR term than for the parameter estimates of the other regressors. Kiviet 
(1995) uses asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small sample bias of the fixed-effects 
estimator. 
19 Early crisis is defined as the first 2 crisis weeks. The EMP crisis dummy is based on data from markets 
other than the stock exchange. The SM dummy is used as an alternative in our robustness tests.   10 
variable (to control for delayed effects), and stock fixed effects. More formally, denoting 




Table 1 reports the results of the seven country panels. In addition, it shows the 
mean group estimators from the stock-by-stock regressions (and the percentage of stocks 
for which the coefficient is significant and of the “expected” sign), and the results of a 
single panel regression including all stocks in our sample.  
As can be seen in the top panel of Table 1, after controlling for returns, the trading 
volume tends to remain stable at the beginning of crises, to decline later on, suggesting a 
drop in activity after portfolio reallocations have been completed. In line with the 
evidence previously reported in the empirical literature, contemporaneous price 
fluctuations, both up and down, appear to be associated with an increase in volume. That 
is, large price downturns during crises are associated with higher trading activity. The 
Amihud ratio remains stable early in the crisis and increases later on (middle panel). On 
the other hand, the link with price fluctuations exhibits an asymmetric pattern: whereas 
price jumps (when significant) are accompanied by lower Amihud ratios (greater 
liquidity), price declines are generally linked to important increases in the ratio. This 
pattern is confirmed by the bottom panel: bid-ask spreads widen significantly during 
crises and with price drops, but barely react to price increases. Importantly, the relevant 
coefficients are comparable not only across countries, but also to those obtained from 
.
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− 11 
stock-by-stock or single-panel regressions (which we show in the last two columns of the 
table). 
In Table 2, we test the robustness of these results to the inclusion of alternative 
crisis measures (for which we use our SM crisis dummy and the EMBI sovereign bond 
spread index compiled by J.P. Morgan, a broader country-specific proxy of financial 
distress), and the evolution of the local stock market index, to control for systemic 
factors. For the sake of conciseness, we report only the results corresponding to a single 
panel regression including all stocks.
20 The results are reassuring: the coefficients of the 
new variables, when significant, are of the expected sign, and the ones of the baseline 
variables largely retain their explanatory power. The only exception is the early crisis 
dummy, which when measured using SM crises is no longer positively correlated with 
volume, although it shows an early widening of the bid-ask spread, possibly reflecting 
differences in the way it dates the start of crises. In addition, our findings are not altered 
by a change in data frequency, as can be seen from the results based on a monthly sample 




Our tests reveal two types of stylized facts. First, they document for emerging 
markets the asymmetric response to price fluctuations previously reported for developed 
markets: market downturns are positively correlated with volume traded and negatively 
correlated with trading costs. Second, they highlight a strong link between crisis episodes 
and liquidity measures. Specifically, we find no evidence of market “paralysis” at the 
                                                 
20 Comparable country-panel and stock-by-stock regression results are available upon request. 
21 As another robustness test, regressions that control for market capitalization gave similar results.  12 
beginning of crises (secondary market activity does not appear to break down): if 
anything, trading activity increases as prices fall abruptly, to decline only later as the 
crisis progresses. However, the cost of making transactions increases sharply; prices 
change more with each dollar transacted (pushing the Amihud illiquidity measure up) and 
bid-ask spreads widen. Thus, while trading activity tends to be negatively related to 
trading costs during tranquil times (and across securities), this relation appears to break 
down during a crisis. 
The results in this paper are consistent with many of the insights proposed by the 
analytical literature including, most notably, the view that crises are associated with 
portfolio reallocation among heterogeneous agents that do not fully anticipate crises 
(hence, volume increases during market downturns, rather than before) and with fire sales 
by liquidity-constrained investors paying a hefty premium to bring in outside capital. We 
leave for future research the task to elucidate the extent to which these complementary 
and mutually consistent stories explain the empirical findings reported here. 
Two additional preliminary implications can be derived from the previous 
exercises. First, distressed reallocations between liquid and illiquid investors are feasible, 
but costly to those wanting to liquidate their positions.
22 Second, the liquidity risk of a 
stock (e.g., as captured by the Amihud ratio) tends to increase at times of systemic 
illiquidity (e.g., as capture by EMP crises), a pattern that should increase the stock 
volatility and be ultimately reflected in its risk-adjusted price. Naturally, the behavior 
documented here is not unique to stock markets and, to a large degree, reflects 
                                                 
22 This would also apply to investors with different information sets, or with different degrees of implicit or 
explicit risk profiles.  13 
developments in the financial system in general.
23 The way in which liquidity measures 
interact between different asset markets is a natural next step in this research agenda. 
                                                 
23 See Levy Yeyati et al. (2004) for an analysis in this direction.  14 
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 Number of Countries and Crisis Events
Number of Countries 7
Number of Crisis Events 12
Log Volume Amihud Ratio Bid-Ask Spread
Number of Stocks-Events Tested 90 89 80
Number Significantly ≠  0 57 71 65
Percentage Negative (of Significant) 25% 15% 17%
Percentage Positive (of Significant) 75% 85% 83%
The event date, marked as time zero, is defined as the beginning of a crisis period. The average changes reported here
correspond to the entire crisis period, not just the 110-day window displayed in the graphs. The table at the bottom reports
the results of the event study tests. The crisis dates are based on the stock market crisis criteria.  
Figure 1. Event Studies
Log Volume
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Pre-crisis mean = 0.017 Post-crisis mean = 0.026
Mean change 
= 0.009Argentina Brazil Indonesia Mexico Russia
South 
Korea
Thailand All Countries All Countries




Absolute Positive Returns 2.807*** 1.613*** 1.935*** 2.769*** 1.659*** 2.191*** 4.172*** 2.681 2.643***
(10.78) (6.00) (6.29) (12.36) (6.66) (9.36) (16.35) 92.2% (20.53)
Absolute Negative Returns 2.055*** 0.779** 1.731*** 1.690*** 1.798*** 1.438*** 2.210*** 1.696 1.804***
(6.16) (2.48) (4.88) (6.09) (5.62) (6.03) (10.01) 62.7% (15.44)
Crisis (EMP) - Early -0.243* 0.308 -0.187 0.869*** 0.051 0.056 0.005 0.203 0.145**
(1.66) (1.33) (1.25) (5.40) (0.49) (0.40) (0.03) 17.6% (2.18)
Crisis (EMP) - Late -0.216*** -0.263* -0.077* -0.064 -0.252*** -0.151** -0.253*** -0.168 -0.158***
(3.75) (1.87) (1.85) (1.43) (3.43) (2.56) (7.45) (45.1%) (8.41)
Volume Lagged 0.587*** 0.486*** 0.691*** 0.514*** 0.645*** 0.859*** 0.767*** 0.600 0.675***
(29.28) (22.47) (41.49) (34.44) (21.26) (81.54) (84.27) - (104.73)
Log Change in Exchange Rate 6.225* 2.764 -1.282 -4.765* -4.782*** -2.676 5.228* -0.013 -1.536*
(1.93) (0.95) (0.96) (1.82) (3.12) (1.11) (1.81) - (1.74)
Observations 2,623 3,643 2,405 5,116 1,782 2,368 4,048 431 21,985
R-squared 0.78 0.84 0.75 0.77 0.92 0.93 0.77 0.50 0.89
Argentina Brazil Indonesia Mexico Russia
South 
Korea
Thailand All Countries All Countries




Absolute Positive Returns  0.021 0.299 -0.032*** -0.015* -0.235* -0.004 -0.044*** 0.047 -0.012
(0.11) (1.46) (2.70) (1.72) (1.90) (1.55) (4.34) (27.5%) (0.32)
Absolute Negative Returns  0.853*** 0.614*** 0.086*** 0.034*** 0.308 0.004 0.081*** 0.349 0.245***
(2.73) (3.08) (2.72) (2.92) (1.10) (1.59) (3.59) 52.9% (3.90)
Crisis (EMP) - Early 0.082 0.204 0.120 -0.005 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.069 0.026
(0.67) (0.90) (1.54) (0.83) (0.18) (0.96) (0.03) (0.0%) (0.68)
Crisis (EMP) - Late 0.238*** -0.014 0.030*** 0.009*** 0.158*** 0.002** 0.017*** 0.058 0.059***
(3.04) (0.35) (5.85) (3.68) (3.39) (2.44) (5.36) 64.7% (5.56)
Amihud Illiquidity Ratio Lagged 0.609*** 0.266*** 0.334*** 0.518*** 0.717*** 0.673*** 0.560*** 0.516 0.504***
(9.98) (5.29) (4.57) (10.39) (6.53) (13.14) (10.69) - (11.77)
Log Change in Exchange Rate -2.960 -1.558 0.236** 0.251** -0.226 0.081** -0.050 -0.554 0.077
(0.89) (1.42) (1.97) (1.98) (0.19) (2.29) (0.19) - (0.18)
Observations 2,607 3,595 2,363 5,104 1,757 2,353 4,038 428 21,817
R-squared 0.48 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.47 0.45 0.36
Argentina Brazil Indonesia Mexico Russia
South 
Korea
Thailand All Countries All Countries




Absolute Positive Returns 0.003 0.01 -0.001 0.019*** -0.017** 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.004**
(0.81) (1.06) (0.94) (3.07) (2.12) (1.33) (0.53) (6.3%) (2.28)
Absolute Negative Returns 0.019*** 0.055*** 0.011** 0.037*** 0.014 0.001 0.002* 0.023 0.022***
(3.49) (4.35) (2.06) (5.28) (0.88) (0.47) (1.85) 37.5% (7.00)
Crisis (EMP) - Early 0.005 -0.013** 0.004** 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
(1.32) (2.54) (2.30) (1.15) (0.86) (0.57) (0.34) 19.1% (1.15)
Crisis (EMP) - Late 0.006*** -0.003 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.000 0.000** 0.004 0.003***
(5.57) (0.90) (5.19) (6.85) (2.07) (1.39) (2.09) 48.9% (6.96)
Bid-Ask Spreads Lagged 0.444*** 0.501*** 0.364*** 0.465*** 0.771*** 0.494*** 0.865*** 0.506 0.527***
(12.20) (10.31) (3.29) (17.22) (9.26) (12.57) (63.17) - (17.28)
Log Change in Exchange Rate 0.056 0.112 0.005 0.114 0.138 -0.007 0.038** 0.068 0.064*
(0.88) (1.14) (0.63) (1.48) (1.12) (0.76) (2.39) - (1.90)
Observations 1,701 2,905 2,216 5,087 1,071 1,925 4,048 395 18,953
R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.45 0.42 0.76 0.35 0.79 0.44 0.63
This table reports weekly estimates for the 7 countries in the sample. The first 7 columns of each panel report fixed-effects panel estimates by country with robust standard errors.
The last column reports fixed-effects panel estimates for all countries. The OLS mean group estimator is the simple average of the coefficients of OLS regressions for the individual
stocks. For this estimator, the across-stock average coefficient, number of observations, and R-squared are reported, as well as the proportion of significant coefficients with the
"expected" sign (at the 10% level) instead of t-statistics. The percentages reported in parentheses (without parentheses) correspond to the percentage of negative (positive) values.
Month dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. *, **, *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 1. Weekly Estimates - EMP Crisis
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